Percepção do risco do islamismo radical

Dying to Win
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Robert A. Pape
RANDOM HOUSE
NEW YORK

Contents
Title Page
Dedication
INTRODUCTION

1 The Growing Threat
2 Explaining Suicide Terrorism
PART I: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

3 A Strategy for Weak Actors
4 Targeting Democracies
5 Learning Terrorism Pays
PART II: THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

6 Occupation and Religious Difference
7 Demystifying al-Qaeda
8 Suicide Terrorist Organizations Around the Globe
PART III: THE INDIVIDUAL LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

9 Altruism and Terrorism
10 The Demographic Profile of Suicide Terrorists
11 Portraits of Three Suicide Terrorists
CONCLUSION

12 A New Strategy for Victory

Appendix I: Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980–2003
Appendix II: Occupations by Democratic States, 1980–2003
Appendix III: Salafism in Major Sunni Muslim Majority Countries
Notes
Acknowledgments
About the Author
Copyright Page
To my mother,
Marlene Pape

INTRODUCTION
1

The Growing Threat
SUICIDE TERRORISM IS rising around the world, but there is great confusion as to why. Since many such attacks—including, of course, those of September 11, 2001—have been perpetrated by Muslim terrorists professing religious motives, it might seem obvious that Islamic fundamentalism is the central cause. This presumption has fueled the belief that future 9/11’s can be avoided only by a wholesale transformation of Muslim societies, a core reason for broad public support in the United States for the recent conquest of Iraq.
However, the presumed connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is misleading and may be encouraging domestic and foreign policies likely to worsen America’s situation and to harm many Muslims needlessly.
I have compiled a database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003—315 attacks in all.1 It includes every attack in which at least one terrorist killed himself or herself