Pratica de eutanásia
Euthanasia: along the road of death and autonomy
Rodrigo Siqueira-Batista 1
Fermin Roland Schramm 2
* Trabalho realizado no
Departamento de Ciências
Sociais, Escola Nacional de
Saúde Pública, Fundação
Oswaldo Cruz e no Núcleo de Estudos em Filosofia e Saúde, Fundação
Educacional Serra dos
Órgãos (Nefisa-Feso).
1 Departamento de Ciências
Sociais, ENSP/Fiocruz e Núcleo de Estudos em
Filosofia e Saúde, Fundação
Educacional Serra dos
Órgãos (Nefisa-Feso).
Av. Alberto Torres 111, Alto,
25964-000, Teresópolis RJ. anaximandro@hotmail.com 2 Departamento de Ciências
Sociais, ENSP/Fiocruz.
Abstract This article sets out from the question:
Would a definition of the concept of death, which could be considered trustworthy and therefore consensual, be considered crucial for the moral legitimacy of euthanasia? It seeks to address this quest expounding on the problems involving the attempts of a scientific definition of death when this definition is necessary for ethical consideration related to the end of life, as it is the case in euthanasia or assisted suicide. The argumentation is based on Hume’s Law which prohibits
“values” to interfere with “facts” and on the evolutionary concept of scientific ideas arising from
Kant’s famous distinction between the unknowable thing-in itself and the knowable thing-as-itappears, which gives rise to a methodological conclusion: the incommensurability between the order of facts and the order of values, meaning that a definition of an event/process such as death can only be compared to the order of facts, and the same applies to values. Furthermore, it seeks to delimit an alternative field for this discussion, which notwithstanding its limitations is quite useful for the bioethical argumentation: the principle of autonomy intrinsic to the order of values.
Key words Bioethics, Euthanasia, Death, Autonomy
Resumo O artigo parte da pergunta: o estabelecimento de um conceito de morte, que possa